Chiropractic care originated in the late 19th century in the United States. Despite opposition from the medical community, it gained popularity in the early 20th century. Founded by Daniel David Palmer, a magnetic healer and former janitor, his belief was that spinal misalignments (a.k.a. subluxations) were the cause of many health problems. In 1895, Palmer performed the first chiropractic adjustment on a deaf janitor, Harvey Lillard, who subsequently reported improved hearing. Palmer’s claims of having discovered a new healing method prompted his coining “chiropractic,” from the Greek cheir (hand) and praktos (done). Based on a mix of spiritualism, magnetic healing and traditional bone-setting practices, Palmer believed that the spine was the body’s nerve center and, as such, subluxations could interfere with the flow of nerve impulses. Established in 1897, the Palmer School of Chiropractic remains one of the practice’s leading institutions.
While Harvey Lillard benefitted from his adjustment, the same cannot be said for Chief Financial Officers (CFOs). This group reports it’s poised to make involuntary adjustments to their firms’ plans based on the administration’s policies. As we’ve seen in surveys across a spectrum of cohorts, the post-election rally in CFO optimism has been arrested. Tariffs and uncertainty are the ties that bind. The latest CFO Survey from the partnership of Duke University and the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta and Richmond is no exception. The headline economic optimism index fell to 62.1 in the first quarter from 66.0 in 2024’s last three months, nearly erasing post-election gains.
In special questions on hiring and capital spending, the Survey expanded: “About a quarter of firms reported that changes to trade policy would negatively impact their hiring and their capital spending plans in 2025. Next to tariffs and trade policy, changes in regulatory policy seemed most likely to affect hiring and capital spending plans, both positively and negatively.” The first chart in today’s quad illustrates these adjustments with the proviso that the form and timing of implementation play an important role in judging the timing of their impact. Net negative effects on planned capex (green bars) and hiring (yellow bars) were indicated by CFOs given the threat of Trade/Tariff and Immigration policies. Not as vexing are Corporate Tax and Regulatory policies. Nevertheless, the modestly positive effects, especially on the potential for capex, should be considered future, not present, tailwinds.
Markets also have been less friendly to CFOs as 2025 has gotten underway. The cresting in the S&P 500 is the most visible. While the pullback at quarter’s end has been modest, this low-frequency snapshot hides the heightened volatility that’s become endemic this year (light green line). Perhaps of greater import, merger and acquisition (M&A) activity has cooled noticeably as completed M&A deals look set to post the largest sequential decline in two years in the first quarter (orange line). Suffice it to say, this counters the Street’s expectation that a virtuous M&A cycle would by now have taken hold. Indeed, the -2.9-point drop in CFOs’ own-firm optimism not only reversed the post-election bump, but it also erased the sum of gains over the last year in the span of three months (purple line).
Using the narrow lens of month-over-month (MoM) performance, February Durable Goods conflicted with C-Suite occupants’ dour views – the 0.9% seasonally adjusted advance for nondefense capital goods shipments excluding aircraft was the strongest in over a year. Smoothing the longer year-over-year (YoY) trend confirmed the downtrend for this direct input into U.S. GDP. Seasonally adjusted core capex shipments have registered modest compression in the last three quarters: -0.7% YoY in 2024’s third quarter, -0.1% in 2024’s fourth quarter and -0.4% thus far in 2025’s first quarter (light blue line).
While these mild contractions don’t raise bright red cyclical warning flags, that’s not the message conveyed in the quarterly not seasonally adjusted path – which is supposed to be nearly identical to the seasonally adjusted one. This raw data series’ -1.9% YoY first quarter drop has historically been the sole preserve of whole-economy or industrial recessions (red dashed line).
We know that business investment is the key determinant of recession, which is why it’s our chief focal point given the current circumstances. After all, the recessions of 1970, 1981 and 2001 featured rising consumption. That should not diminish our attention to the power wielded, or not, by U.S. consumers when they too are increasingly distressed. On that note, yesterday, the New York Fed released a new analysis estimating that “more than nine million student loan borrowers will face significant drops in credit score once delinquencies appear on credit reports in the first half of 2025.”
As background, post-pandemic forbearance and the Fresh Start program (that marked all defaulted loans as current) generated sizable gains in credit scores (103 points for delinquencies and 72 points for default vis-à-vis yearend-2019). With that in mind, the NY Fed estimated a “shadow delinquency rate” to gauge the scope of the rise in missed payments after the 2023 resumption in payments. No surprise, this shadow rate reached a new high of 15.6% last year, taking out the 2018 prior high (blue line). New York Fed economists concluded that a new student loan delinquency can reduce credit scores by more than 150 points, leaving borrowers with scarred credit access. Further household balance sheet impairment would pile on cyclical impediments to those already challenging the U.S. economy.